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CURRENT DECISIONS

ATTORNEYS—DISBARMENT—NO IMMUNITY FROM PREVIOUS COMPULSORY SELF-CRIMINATION.—In a criminal trial an attorney had given testimony which amounted to a confession of professional misconduct. In subsequent disbarment proceedings based on such misconduct, he claimed immunity by force of section 584 of N. Y. Penal Code which provides, in substance, that no person shall be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture on account of anything concerning which he may have been compelled to testify. *Held*, that the statutory immunity from penalties and forfeitures did not prevent disbarment, as disbarment is not punishment but revocation of a privilege conditioned upon honorable professional conduct. *In re Rouss* (1917, N. Y.) 116 N. E. 782.

In construing this section of the code in its application to disbarment proceedings, the case seems to be one of first impression; and the high plane upon which the court places its jurisdiction to disbar is worthy of note. *Cf. Beckner v. Commonwealth* (1907) 126 Ky. 318, 103 S. W. 378.

ATTORNEYS—PRACTICE DURING SUSPENSION AS CONTEMPT.—By order of the Supreme Court each of the defendants was suspended from "practice in all the courts of this state" for one year. During the year they kept open an office, displayed the usual signs indicating that the office was a law office and that they were attorneys at law, used and sent through the mails stationery indicating that they were attorneys, and permitted their names to appear as attorneys in the city and telephone directories. *Held*, that these acts constituted contempt of court. Roberts, J., *dissenting*. *State v. Marron* (1917, N. M.) 167 Pac. 9.

CARRIERS—HOURS OF SERVICE ACT—COMPUTING TIME.—The Hours of Service Act (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, sec. 8678) forbids keeping certain telegraph operators on duty for more "than 9 hours in any 24 hour period." An operator whose regular day was 7 A. M. to 4 P. M., on one occasion worked from 7 A. M. to 1.30 P. M., was off duty till 3 P. M., then worked till 5.10 P. M. and next day resumed his regular schedule of 7 A. M. to 4 P. M. Thus he worked more than 9 hours out of the 24 hour period beginning at 3 P. M. but not more than 9 hours out of any 24 hour period beginning at 7 A. M. *Held*, that the Act was not violated, since in fairness to the Railway Company the 24 hour period should be construed to begin at the time the employee first goes on duty for his day's work. *United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.* (1917, C. C. A. 8th) 244 Fed. 38.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE PROCESS—PROHIBITION OF MANUFACTURE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.—The defendant was charged with violating a Washington statute which provided that it should be unlawful for any person to manufacture, sell, barter, exchange, or give away any intoxicating liquor. His offence consisted in making "grape wine" exclusively for his own personal use. *Held*, that this was an offense prohibited by the statute and that the statute, so construed, was constitutional. *State v. Fabbri* (1917, Wash.) 167 Pac. 133.

This case seems to be the first actually holding it constitutional to forbid the manufacture of liquor for personal use. It is supported by a *dictum* of Mr.